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ARTICLES 
FUNDING INNOVATION: REGULATING SEED 
FINANCING 
Kevin Laws† & Zeb Zankel†† 
Unlike traditional regulatory approaches applied to Wall Street-
style transactions, seed financing in Silicon Valley has developed with 
benign neglect from lawmakers; meaning that securities laws were out-
of-sync with the financings but regulators ignored enforcement of 
violations. Meanwhile, seed investors have achieved fraud prevention, 
a smoothly functioning market, and other policy objectives in different 
ways. Now that the explosion of startup financing has garnered the 
attention of the SEC, we argue that regulating seed financing should 
differ from the methods used in larger, traditional financings, 
otherwise compliance costs will severely impede financial activity 
without improving investor protections. Although the federal 
government made a great leap forward in passing the JOBS Act and 
issuing no-action letters beneficial to seed financing, a host of 
regulatory barriers and ambiguities still remain. This article does not 
recommend specific regulations, but does recommend seven principles 
that are important in funding innovative-technology markets, where the 
markets are defined by high levels of asymmetric information and small 
transaction amounts. These principles should guide regulators and 
lawmakers as they consider how to encourage more small-scale 
financing of innovation, without introducing new opportunities for 
fraud or creating bad experiences for investors and companies.* 
 
 
 † Kevin Laws is Chief Investment Officer for AngelList. He received his computer 
science degree from Dickinson College, and MBA from the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology’s Sloan School of Management. 
 †† Zeb Zankel is a newly minted attorney. He received a B.A. with Honors from Wesleyan 
University, and a J.D. from Santa Clara University School of Law.  
 * Abstract provided by Brian Wood, J.D. Candidate at Santa Clara School of Law and 
Associate on the Santa Clara High Tech. Law Journal.  
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INTRODUCTION 
People often forget that, less than a decade ago, the ubiquitous 
Facebook raised its first small round of investment—$600,000.1 The 
first round of financing a company raises is generally called a seed 
round or a seed financing, where the round is so small that individuals, 
including wealthy investors, nicknamed angels, can invest.2 While the 
numbers are debated, the typical total amount of capital raised during 
a seed round can range from a few hundred thousand dollars to a couple 
million dollars.3  
 1. TOM TAULLI, HOW TO CREATE THE NEXT FACEBOOK: SEEING YOUR STARTUP 
THROUGH, FROM IDEA TO IPO 52 (2012). 
 2. See Alternative Investments: The Stages in Venture Capital Investing, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/exam-guide/cfa-level-1/alternative-investments/venture-capital-in 
vesting-stages.asp (last visited January 14, 2015). 
 3. Id.; see also David H. Freedman, The Great Funding Flameout, INC. MAG., Oct. 2013, 
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Seed financing represents a small, but very important, portion of 
financing activity in the United States.4 This area of finance is 
characterized by small transactions and extreme information 
asymmetry on both sides of the deal.5 The seed-stage market developed 
its own methods for dealing with these challenging characteristics—
methods that have been very effective at preventing fraud and 
protecting both investors and companies.6 This market has emerged 
with benign neglect from the regulators (whether intentional or not).7 
However, now that seed-financing activity is becoming much more 
public and growing so dramatically, regulators are getting more 
involved.8  
Traditional regulatory approaches do not protect investors or help 
companies raise money in seed-stage markets nearly as well as the 
mechanisms that have emerged naturally.9 In fact, some existing 
regulatory approaches, if imposed, could severely impede activity 
without improving investor protections at all.10 The law in this area of 
financing has developed significantly in recent years to account for 
these issues,11 which is a step in the right direction. However, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is currently wrestling with 
the details of investor protection—some of which could have a major 
impact on seed financing.12 What would be considered modest legal 
and compliance costs in a large Wall Street transaction can actually 
prevent smaller transactions from occurring at all.13 
This article generally addresses how seed financing is different 
from traditional financing and suggests principles for government 
agencies to use when regulating seed-financing markets.14 In Part I, this 
at 78, 80, available at http://www.inc.com/magazine/201310/david-freedman/why-the-series-a-
crunch-might-be-good.html. Following the seed round are the usual venture rounds (Series A, B, 
C, etc.). Each round of venture capital investment is designated a series letter in sequential order 
so that the first time that a company seeks venture capital funding, it is designated as Series A, 
the second time is Series B, and onward. See David Newton, Understanding the Financing Stages, 
ENTREPRENEUR (July 15, 2001), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/42336. 
 4. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 5. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 6. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 7. See discussion infra Part II. 
 8. See discussion infra Part III. 
 9. See discussion infra Part I. 
 10. See discussion infra Part III. 
 11. See discussion infra Part V.F. 
 12. See discussion infra Part V.F. 
 13. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 14. The article will focus specifically on seed financing of technology startups because the 
explosion of this type of financing has influenced recent financial regulations as discussed in Part 
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article explores the importance, characteristics, size, and methods of 
seed financing of technology startups. Part II focuses on the history of 
regulatory dysfunction surrounding seed financing. In Part III, this 
article reviews the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act and 
SEC No-Action Letters and their effect on seed financing. Part IV 
addresses the unwarranted concerns about fraud and over-promised 
results in seed financings. Finally, Part V announces seven principles 
to inform appropriate regulation of seed financing and innovation in 
general. 
I. SEED FINANCING OVERVIEW 
A. Seed-Stage Technology Startups Matter 
The amount of money invested in seed-stage technology startups 
is miniscule in proportion to other types of investments in the United 
States. Venture capital (VC) seed-stage investments totaled nearly $1 
billion in 2013.15 To put that in context, the entire seed-stage portfolio 
from 2013 would represent approximately .022% of the assets of a 
single Wall Street firm (Black Rock).16 
However small, seed-stage investments generate an outsized 
impact on the economy. According to the Kauffman Foundation,17 all 
net job creation from 1999–2011 in the United States’ private business 
sector came from firms under five years of age.18 The technology 
startups of roughly the last fifteen years include some of the largest 
companies in the world today—household names like Google and 
Facebook.19 Because these technology startups have already had such 
III. The authors, however, see no reason why the principles discussed in this paper would not be 
beneficial for the health and security of seed financing overall. 
 15. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS & NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, MONEYTREE 
REPORT ON 2013 U.S. VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENTS (Thompson Reuters data, Jan. 17, 2014) 
($942,952,900 invested over 218 seed-stage deals). 
 16. About Us, BLACKROCK, http://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-us/about-us (last 
visited May 19, 2013) ($4.3 trillion in assets). 
 17. The Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation is one of the largest private foundations in 
the country and focuses its operations on education and entrepreneurship. Who We Are, EWING 
MARION KAUFFMAN FOUND., http://www.kauffman.org/who-we-are (last visited Nov. 15, 2014). 
 18. Ian Hathaway, Tech Starts: High-Technology Business Formation and Job Creation in 
the United States, in KAUFFMAN FOUND. RESEARCH SERIES ON FIRM FORMATION AND ECON. 
GROWTH 4–5 (2013), available at http://www.kauffman.org/~/media/kauffman_org/research 
%20reports%20and%20covers/2013/08/bdstechstartsreport.pdf. The author defines net job 
creation as gross job creation (through business births and expansions) minus gross job destruction 
(through business closures and contractions). Id. 
 19. See FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/facebook/info?tab=page_info (last visited 
January 14, 2015) (founded in 2004); About Google, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com 
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a positive impact on the United States economy, it would seem that 
creating more of these companies would benefit workers, innovators, 
and consumers alike. 
B. Characteristics of Seed Deals 
In theory, the seed-stage market probably should not exist at all. 
Entrepreneurs know far more about their motivations, business 
progress, and abilities than do investors. On the other hand, sophisti-
cated investors often better understand the current market prices, terms, 
and financial arrangements. Thus, the market is characterized by 
asymmetric information on both sides of the transaction. Moreover, the 
size of the financing prevents the exchange of that knowledge in a cost-
effective manner; in that it would not make financial sense for 
extensive due diligence on such a small deal. Instead, entrepreneurs and 
investors may use simple rules to guide their decision-making, such as 
an investor using heuristics to invest in a company where the founding 
engineering team is from MIT, or where the other investor in that deal 
has a strong track record. 
Take for example Jeremy Orlow, who used AngelList to raise 
financing for Apptimize, a company that helped developers test 
changes in mobile applications.20 When investors looked at his profile, 
they did not see a full Wall Street-style private-placement 
memorandum (PPM). Instead, they saw a founder who attended Purdue 
University, a video of the product in action, and a summary of the 
terms.21 Often times this is all that is needed to obtain financing. 
Based on the experience of author Kevin Laws,22 the following 
are key characteristics of how seed deals are formed and closed: 
•  Screening is based on trust. With nothing to diligence or take if the 
entrepreneur is wrong, the investment becomes in large part about 
judging the credibility and skills of the founders. Intermediaries get in 
the way of the direct relationships needed for good judgment. 
• Networks rule. The original idea of “friends-and-family” money was 
to raise funding from a few people who knew the founders.23 That is 
not an option for the large number of companies raising these days, 
/about/company/ (last visited January 14, 2015) (founded in 1998). 
 20. See Apptimize, ANGELLIST, https://angel.co/apptimize (last visited May 22, 2014).  
 21. Id. See generally APPTIMIZE, http://apptimize.com/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2014). 
 22. In his decades in Silicon Valley, founding and serving on the board of several 
technology companies, and investing in dozens more companies, he has developed strong 
expertise in the area of seed financing. 
 23. See Paul Graham, How to Fund a Startup, PAULGRAHAM.COM (Nov. 2005), 
http://www.paulgraham.com/startupfunding.html. 
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nor for the amounts they need (it would require a very rich uncle to 
close a $1 million round). As a result, most of the investments are done 
via trust networks—one investor forms the relationship with the 
company, and the others bet on that investor’s judgment. Social 
networks online have allowed these previously small trust networks to 
extend another degree of separation, dramatically increasing the reach 
of the trust network. 
• The transactions are small, so diligence and governance are informal. 
A standard checklist used in a later-stage venture financing would 
overwhelm a seed-round transaction, eating up a large portion of the 
financing raised.24 Instead, seed-stage investors use their experience 
to decide which items are critical and ignore the rest. Governance is 
done in the same way—with primarily informal updates and meetings 
between a few investors and the founding team. 
• Friction is deadly. The best seed-stage investors are typically founders 
and operators of other startups. These people are already plugged into 
entrepreneurs and know what makes for a successful company. 
However, they have demanding day jobs, which means that the 
financing process must be easy for them to participate. They can bring 
great value—like making a well-placed call or providing advice at the 
right time—so long as they are not overloaded with paperwork 
demands. VC firms have large and expensive offices dedicated to 
dealing with all the regulatory and legal issues. Most angels do not. 
These characteristics push seed investing towards trust networks 
of individuals who manage their own money to avoid middlemen and 
execute quick deals. A seed-stage technology company using a broker 
would be shunned by many investors because the cost of the broker 
eats into the costs that should be used to help the company grow. 
Beyond that, a seed-stage company who produces a formal PPM would 
be accused by savvy investors of wasting time that could be spent 
building a better product or attracting new customers. 
C. Declining Costs, a Startup Explosion, and Seed Financing 
The cost of starting a new technology company has declined 
dramatically.25 Startups no longer require the trappings of a larger 
company in order to launch: accounting, back office, and human 
 24. Venture Capital Due Diligence Checklist, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, http:// 
www.businessweek.com/small-business/business-forms/venture-capital-due-diligence-checklist 
(last visited January 15, 2015). 
 25. See Stuart Ellman, How to Incubate a Company From Start to Finish (pt. 3), INC.  
(Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.inc.com/stuart-ellman/how-much-funding-does-a-start-up-need-to-
launch.html.  
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resources are outsourced (Backops, Trinet);26 marketing is carried out 
by social- and viral-platforms (Facebook, Twitter);27 distribution is 
handled by app stores (Apple, Android);28 and data storage is rented on 
cloud-based systems (Amazon, Rackspace).29  
As costs decline, the same deal price can potentially take a 
company much further with the same influx of cash, but with less costs. 
Further, the declining costs have, in part, led to an explosion of new 
startups. Ludwig Siegele, in a special report on tech startups for the 
Economist, calls this age an “entrepreneurial explosion,” likening it the 
“Cambrian Explosion” of ecological diversity that occurred 540 
million years ago.30 Where there has been an explosion of technology 
startups that rely on seed financing, it is increasingly important to 
appropriately regulate seed financing and ensure this explosion does 
not hurt investors or entrepreneurs along the way.  
D. Seed Financing Methods Have Changed 
The amount of funding required to launch a new company has 
dropped so quickly that traditional financing mechanisms have failed. 
Conducting a traditional full diligence, reviewing an entire Wall Street-
style PPM, negotiating a financing round, and drafting custom legal 
documents to register the company all comprise only a small 
percentage of a large financing round (Series A and above).31 But the 
same costs during seed financing can be a significant portion of the 
financing,32 which makes the deal less appetizing for companies and 
investors alike.  
 26. See BACKOPS, https://www.backops.co/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2014); TRINET, http:// 
www.trinet.com/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2014).  
 27. See FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2014); TWITTER, 
https://twitter.com/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2014).  
 28. See APPLE, http://www.apple.com/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2014); ANDROID, http:// 
www.android.com/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2014).  
 29. See AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2014); RACKSPACE, 
http://www.rackspace.com/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2014).  
 30. Ludwig Siegele, Tech Startups: A Cambrian Moment, ECONOMIST (SPECIAL REPORT), 
Jan. 18, 2014, at 4, 4–5, available at http://media.economist.com/sites/default/files 
/sponsorships/[KY56b]Huawei/180114_SR.pdf. 
 31. See Christina Desmarais, 3 Ways to Shrink Your Start-Up Legal Costs, INC. (Feb. 13, 
2012), http://www.inc.com/christina-desmarais/3-ways-to-shrink-your-start-up-legal-costs.html. 
Since Series A financing costs $52,000 in legal fees on average, id., which would be 1% of the 
financing if raising the average Series A round of roughly $5 million in capital. Freedman, supra 
note 3. 
 32. Since legal costs prior to Series A can be around $25,000, Desmarais, supra note 31, 
and seed round size can range from few hundred thousand dollars to a couple million dollars, 
Freedman, supra note 3, the math works out to roughly 2%–10% of the financing round. These 
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The seed-financing market is still adjusting in many ways. Large 
traditional venture firms like Andreessen Horowitz are pulling back 
significantly on the number of investments they are making in the seed 
market.33 Law firms representing startups are, for example, deferring 
fees until after the closing date of the next financing round.34 However, 
these trends place startup-focused law firms in the exact venture–
investor position that thrived in the dot-com era, putting lawyers in a 
position to decide which companies are most likely to be successful.35 
As the name indicates, lawyers are experts in law and not necessarily 
the technology business, so, logically, investment by lawyers instead 
of technology business experts can lead to economic inefficiencies. At 
the same time, even experienced venture companies have shifted away 
from seed funding.36 
A new breed of investor specializing in seed-stage investments has 
filled the gap: experienced founders of other tech seed companies. On 
AngelList,37 over 70% of accredited investors have founded or run at 
least one company or invested in more than two startups.38 These 
investors have made a large impact in the seed finance world, and 
include businesspeople like Gil Penchina (former CEO of Wikia), Evan 
Williams (founder of Twitter), and Jeremy Stoppelman (founder of 
Yelp).39 
calculations do not include non-legal costs which could potentially drive the percentage even 
higher. 
 33. See Andreesen Horowitz Backs Out of Seed Investing, Interview with Marc Andreesen, 
STRICTLYVC (Oct. 20, 2013), http://www.strictlyvc.com/2013/10/20/andreessen-horowitz-
backs-seed-investing/. 
 34. Scott Edward Walker, How Should a Startup Pay Its Attorneys?, Guest Column, VB 
NEWS (Nov. 22, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://venturebeat.com/2010/11/22/cash-equity-how-should-a 
-startup-pay-its-attorneys/. 
 35. Christine Hurt, Counselor, Gatekeeper, Shareholder, Thief: Why Attorneys Who Invest 
in Their Clients in a Post-Enron World are “Selling Out,” not “Buying In,” 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 897, 
898–99 (2003). 
 36. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS & NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, MONEYTREE 
REPORT ON Q1 2014 (Thompson Reuters data, May 2014) [hereinafter 2014 MONEYTREE 
REPORT] (“[VC] seed stage investments fell 64 percent in dollars and 41 percent in deals with 
$125 million invested into 41 deals in the first quarter.”). 
 37. AngelList is a web-based platform where the world meets startups, investors invest in 
early-stage startups, and startups find team members, angel investors and venture capital. See 
generally ANGELLIST, https://angel.co/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2014). 
 38. Letter from Naval Ravikant, CEO, AngelList, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 (June 3, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-13/s 
70613-513.pdf (commenting on proposed amendments to Regulation D, Form D, and Rule 156); 
see also Investors, ANGELLIST, https://angel.co/people/investors (last visited May 22, 2014).  
 39. See Investors, ANGELLIST, supra note 38. 
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Most of the remaining investors on AngelList are seed funds of 
one form or another.40 Each of these funds and investors has found a 
way to navigate the new landscape of small financing rounds. 
However, regulations have not yet caught up to the way that modern 
seed financings function. 
II. A HISTORY OF REGULATORY DYSFUNCTION 
A. The SEC’s Benign Neglect and Overregulation 
Until recently, the SEC’s approach to the seed-financing market 
was what securities lawyer Sam Guzik called a “combination of benign 
neglect and overregulation.”41 On one hand, the securities laws veered 
towards overregulation and were increasingly out-of-sync with the 
nature of the financings. For example, prior to the JOBS Act, general 
solicitation rules dictated that a company could not tell the public of a 
company’s financing unless it was a public offering, so Wall Street 
firms were justifiably paranoid about any news of an ongoing private-
company financing being leaked to the press.42 On the other hand, SEC 
practiced benign neglect where Silicon Valley was concerned. Startups 
would regularly announce their intent to raise financing at demo days, 
events where startups pitched their business plans to investors.43 The 
tech-press attended demo days, focusing attention on the startups, the 
lawyers closed the financings, and the demo days continued along 
unabated without SEC enforcement of general solicitation rules.44 
Wall Street firms that arranged for meetings between investors 
and fundraising companies had to register as broker–dealers with the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), a self-regulatory 
organization (SRO).45 Every web page was considered a broker 
advertisement and was subject to approval by FINRA, while the Silicon 
Valley firms did not register with any entity.46 On Wall Street, brokers 
 40. See Funds, ANGELLIST, https://angel.co/funds (last visited Jan. 28, 2015). 
 41. Sam Guzik, Dawn of a New Era: SEC White Speaks to Small Business, CORP. SEC. 
LAWYER BLOG (Feb. 2, 2014), http://corporatesecuritieslawyerblog.com/?p=439. 
 42. See SEC Rule Prohibiting General Solicitation, 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c)(1)–(2) (2014). 
 43. See Dan Primack, The Future of ‘Demo Days’ in an Era of General Solicitation, 
FORTUNE (Sept. 20, 2013, 12:47 PM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2013/09/20/future-of-
demo-days/. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See About FINRA, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited May 22, 
2014). 
 46. See FINRA Rule 2210 (2014) (“Communications with the Public”); see also Primack, 
supra note 43.  
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thoroughly vetted each company in which they considered investing.47 
Theoretically these same rules applied in Silicon Valley, however, in 
practice the investors had to fend for themselves—and, in the 
experience of the author, preferred it that way, since they wanted direct 
founder relationships and resented any broker interference. On Wall 
Street, the broker had to carefully screen each investor for suitability.48 
In Silicon Valley, investors were implicitly screened, since companies 
only wanted value-added investors.49 Seed investors, who were used to 
closing deals on a handshake, would be scared away if entrepreneurs 
presented them with stacks of papers to fill out and sign before striking 
a deal.50 In other words, the standard securities regulations remained in 
effect for the typical Wall Street investor—regulations that would shut 
down the nascent seed-financing market if enforced in their heaviest 
form—but were not enforced as a practical matter in Silicon Valley, in 
a manner of benign neglect. 
The benign neglect continued as long as the number of seed 
investments was small, done behind closed doors, and not announced 
too loudly outside the tech-press. As soon as a firm would crossover 
into the more public eye, it would have to step into the Wall Street form 
of regulation. For example, before Garage Technology Ventures 
(formerly Garage.com), an incubator, filed to go public in February of 
2000, they registered with the National Association of Securities 
Dealers (later renamed FINRA) as a broker.51  
However, a decade into the twenty-first century, the Internet and 
the explosion of startups and angel investors changed everything. 
Suddenly, the Silicon Valley method was playing out very publicly. 
Major publications like the New York Times covered the demo days 
where startups raising money presented their companies.52 Other 
entities justifiably wanted a part of the Silicon Valley-style market, 
 47. See FINRA Rule 2111 (2014) (“Suitability Obligations”).  
 48. See Suitability: What Investors Need to Know, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/Inves 
tors/ProtectYourself/BeforeYouInvest/P197434 (last visited May 22, 2014). 
 49. See Hollie Slade, When Experience is Worth More Than Cash: The Rise of the 
Entrepreneur-Investor, FORBES (Apr. 17, 2014, 2:20 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/hollie 
slade/2014/04/17/when-experience-is-worth-more-than-cash-the-rise-of-the-entrepreneur-
investor. 
 50. See Paul Graham, The Handshake Deal Protocol, Y COMBINATOR (Mar. 2013), 
http://www.ycombinator.com/handshake/. 
 51. See Garage.com, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), Registration No. 333-30174 
(Feb. 11, 2000). 
 52. See Anthony Ha, Five New Y Combinator Start-Ups to Watch, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 25, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/external/venturebeat/2010/08/24/24venturebeat-five 
-new-y-combinator-startups-to-watch-3065.html?dbk. 
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leading to governments hosting demo days—even the U.S. Small 
Business Administration (SBA) hosted one in 2013.53  
In 2010, Internet startups emerged to automate and scale all of 
these activities. The primary author’s own company, AngelList, was 
among them. Financing was now completely visible, and was working 
the way Silicon Valley did, not Wall Street. The strategy of benign 
neglect could not continue. 
In 2011, AngelList received a letter from the SEC’s Enforcement 
Division as part of an inquiry into financing portals and platforms.54 
The company’s Wall Street securities lawyers suggested that this was 
just the beginning and to dig in for the long haul.55  
B. Other Regulatory Challenges for Seed Financing 
Applying the old philosophy to these small financing transactions 
simply does not work. In the technology-financing world, there were at 
least two methods of financing: friends-and-family rounds, and large 
institutional rounds.56 The first was intended for raising small amounts 
of money to get the idea off the ground—but smaller than necessary to 
actually build a company and product with real traction.57  
When moving to institutional rounds, companies would either tour 
VC firms or use a broker to raise money.58 The ban on general 
solicitation59 created an environment where VC firms could raise large 
pots of money and announce to the world that they were open for 
business—so that companies needing funding would seek them out.60 
 53. See, e.g., Natale Goriel, Blog, Accelerator Demo Day Comes to Washington, DC, 
SMALL BUS. ADMIN. (July 2, 2013), http://www.sba.gov/community/blogs/accelerator-demo 
-day-comes-washington-dc-learn-how-you-can-participate. 
 54. Letter from SEC Enforcement Division to AngelList Regarding Financing Portals and 
Platforms (2011) (on file with author). 
 55. The SEC’s inquiry ended several months later without action on the part of the SEC. 
Thankfully, the Wall Street securities lawyers were wrong. 
 56. See Graham, How to Fund a Startup, supra note 23. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See id.  
 59. General solicitation is undefined in the statute but may include: (1) any advertisement, 
article, notice or other communication published in any newspaper, magazine, or similar media 
or broadcast over television and radio; and (2) any seminar or meeting whose attendees have been 
invited by any general solicitation or general advertising. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c)(1)–(2) 
(2014). 
 60. See Ryan Caldbeck, How General Solicitation Will Change Private Equity and Venture 
Capital Forever, FORBES (Sep. 23, 2013, 12:16 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites 
/ryancaldbeck/2013/09/23/how-general-solicitation-will-change-private-equity-and-venture-capi 
tal-forever/ (companies could not go straight to investors, so the venture capital and private equity 
firms served as an intermediary connector). 
 
08_ARTICLE_LAWS+ZEB (DO NOT DELETE) 3/13/2015  8:02 PM 
12 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 31 
But startup companies were forbidden from doing the same by the rules 
surrounding general solicitation.61  
As a result, startup companies would often tour Sand Hill Road in 
Menlo Park, California, where seemingly every venture firm office is 
located.62 Alternatively, they would hire a broker to tap into existing 
investor networks to raise capital.63 Both methods inserted large costs 
into the system. Most of the costs were borne by the investor in the case 
of venture funds (in the form of fees and carry paid to the fund 
managers). Alternatively, the costs were borne by the company in the 
case of a broker (where a percent of the fee raised was paid by the 
company). Along with those additional costs, VC firms and brokers 
became less common in first rounds as the cost of starting a company 
and correlating investment amounts dropped.64 Incubators and 
accelerators have stepped in to help connect young companies with 
capital.65 At the same time, where traditional VC firms have moved 
into later-stage funding,66 private seed-stage investors have become 
more prevalent and filled the gap.67 
As shown above, the limitations on seed-stage companies when 
seeking capital has played a role in triggering unnecessary additional 
costs, and later limiting the pool of investors active in the seed stage. 
As regulators attempt to resolve these economic inefficiencies without 
upending traditional regulations on other sorts of financing, several 
major questions remain unanswered. 
The first question is whether demo days or press breaking news of 
a financing are considered general solicitation. On September 23, 2013, 
the Securities Exchange Commission began to allow companies to use 
 61. See supra note 59. 
 62. See Venture Capital: Sand Hill Road Rules the Valley, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK 
(Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-12-04/venture-capital-sand-hill 
-road-rules-silicon-valley. 
 63. See J.J. Colao, In the Crowdfunding Gold Rush, This Company has a Rare Edge, 
FORBES (June 5, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jjcolao/2013/06/05/in-the-crowdfunding 
-gold-rush-this-company-has-a-rare-edge/. 
 64. See 2014 MONEYTREE REPORT, supra note 36.  
 65. Verne Kopytoff, The Number—and Variety—of Business Incubators is on the Rise, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-11 
-06/the-number-and-variety-of-business-incubators-is-on-the-rise. Incubators select startups, 
mentor participants about business basics, make introductions to potential customers and partners, 
and help find investors and financing. Id. Accelerators are similar to incubators yet the primary 
distinguishing characteristic is that accelerators are brief programs, lasting at times for three 
months. Id. 
 66. Mark Suster, The Changing Structure of the VC Industry, FORTUNE (Jul. 22, 2014, 9:15 
AM EST), http://fortune.com/2014/07/22/the-changing-structure-of-the-vc-industry/. 
 67. See Slade, supra note 49. 
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general solicitation to raise funds only if: (1) taking money from 
accredited investors (e.g., high net worth individuals), and (2) taking 
reasonable steps to verify that the investors in the company are 
accredited investors.68 Many investors likely do not want to share their 
credit reports, tax returns, and other personal financial documents with 
the companies they invest in or spend the money on lawyers or 
accountants to verify that investors are accredited. Hence, the question 
remains whether a pitch competition, demo day, or other entrepreneur 
event constitutes a general solicitation violation, especially when even 
government agencies themselves are hosting demo days.69 
The second question is whether incubators are brokers. Under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a broker is defined as any person 
engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the 
account of others.70 Incubators arrange meetings between the 
companies and investors, take a strong hand setting terms, and receive 
benefits from doing so (in the form of ownership).71  
The final question is how do companies find and meet investors 
that are outside their direct circle without using a broker. Demo days 
and extensive networks have traditionally been the way this is 
accomplished.72 While the JOBS Act offers a provision for conditional 
general solicitation, this tool has rigorous requirements that might deter 
investors,73 so the issue of seed-stage companies accessing capital 
remains. 
The presence of these lingering questions has led to many forms 
of dysfunctional behavior. As mentioned earlier, large VC funds can 
reach out to companies while seed-stage companies cannot talk 
publicly about needing money.74 This creates many inefficiencies. For 
example, it is generally known inside the technology-startup industry 
which funds actually have capital to spend and which are taking 
meetings just to stay plugged-in. But companies do not know this 
information, so they can waste their time pitching the wrong funds as a 
result. This legally sanctioned imbalance between investor and 
company can be detrimental to encouraging our technology innovation 
companies because of the barrier to accessing capital.  
 68. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 501, 126 Stat. 
306, 325 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1)(A)). 
 69. See Goriel, supra note 53  
 70. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (2013).  
 71. Kopytoff, supra note 65. 
 72. Goriel, supra note 53. 
 73. JOBS Act § 501. 
 74. See supra text accompanying note 60. 
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III. THE JOBS ACT AND SEC NO-ACTION LETTERS 
Regulators face an extremely difficult challenge. How should they 
craft rules that allow the new financing methods to continue without 
accidentally opening up loopholes that upend the status quo elsewhere? 
Put more simply—how would they let a seed-stage company meet a 
sophisticated investor in Silicon Valley without allowing a scammer to 
call a retiree in Boise? 
The initial steps were promising. The JOBS Act passed with 
bipartisan support through Congress and was signed into law in 2012.75 
This legislation contained a number of amendments to federal 
securities regulations that made capital formation easier for startups: 
•  Shareholder Numbers. The number of investors a company with over 
$10 million in assets can have without being registered with the SEC 
was raised from 500 to 2,000.76 
• Solicitation. Companies can now publicly announce financings, so 
long as the ultimate investors are accredited and the company took 
reasonable steps to verify accreditation.77 Before the JOBS Act, 
companies could not publicly advertise or solicit investments.78 
• Accredited Platforms. Platforms that allow accredited investors and 
companies to meet may perform a number of functions (including 
diligence services and standardized documents) without registering as 
a broker-dealer with FINRA.79 
• Crowdfunding. A new exemption permits fundraising from a large 
number of small investors, provided that all purchases are made 
through a registered broker or funding portal. Investors may only 
invest limited amounts, which vary according to annual income or net 
worth of the investor.80 
 75. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112–106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (enacted Apr. 5, 2012); Ed 
O’Keefe, House Passes JOBS Act, Sends Bill to Obama, Post in 2Chambers Blog, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 27, 2012, 3:10 PM ET), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/2chambers/post/house 
-passes-jobs-act-sends-bill-to-obama/2012/03/27/gIQA9DfZeS_blog.html (“The bipartisan mea-
sure, strongly backed by both parties and the White House, passed 380 to 41.”). 
 76. JOBS Act § 501; SEC STAFF, JOBS ACT SECTION 504 REPORT ON AUTHORITY TO 
ENFORCE EXCHANGE ACT RULE 12g5-1 AND SUBSECTION (B)(3), at 6 (2012). 
 77. JOBS ACT § 201(a)(1). 
 78. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2014). 
 79. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2013). 
 80. Id.; see also SEC Proposed Crowdfunding Regulation, Securities Act Release No. 
9470, Exchange Act Release No. 70741, 78 Fed. Reg. 66428 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249). Crowdfunding, raising many small 
amounts of money from large amounts of people, may yet play a role, but at the time of this article, 
the SEC has proposed regulations that make it significantly more costly and difficult than raising 
from accredited investors. Id. Since accredited platforms like AngelList exist, we believe it is 
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The JOBS Act contained many other provisions, though those 
have less impact on seed financings—for example, the provisions 
relating to initial public offerings for emerging growth companies, 
which only applies to companies that have been around for at least two 
years, and not brand new companies.81 
Beyond the clear startup focus evident in the title of the JOBS Act, 
the SEC staff has been active in drawing distinctions between different 
types of financing in their enforcement of the law. The SEC’s Division 
of Trading and Markets issued a statement clarifying the rules for 
accredited platforms such as AngelList, which made very clear their 
intent to try to keep the Wall Street and Silicon Valley rules separate: 
“As a practical matter, we believe that the prohibition on compensation 
makes it unlikely that a person outside the venture capital area would 
be able to rely on the exemption from broker-dealer registration.”82 
After the JOBS Act passed, the SEC Division of Trading and Markets 
issued two no-action letters, one to AngelList,83 and one to 
FundersClub.84 The no-action letters have three practical effects: 
•  The creator of a single-security fund is not a broker. If an intermediary 
creates a fund that invests in a single security, the intermediary is not 
a broker; it is an advisor to the fund, and only needs to register as an 
investment advisor or exempt reporting investment advisor.85 
• The advisor can charge carried interest. The advisor cannot receive 
compensation for closing the transaction but it can receive 
compensation in the form of carried interest for its services.86 
• An angel can receive carried interest from the fund. Anybody paid to 
effectuate or arrange a transaction in securities generally has to be 
unlikely that the tech community will use equity crowdfunding much in its currently proposed 
form. 
 81. Securities Act of 1933 § 7(a)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 77g(a)(2)(A) (2013).  
 82. SEC STAFF, DIV. OF TRADING & MKTS., FAQ’S: EXEMPTION FROM BROKER–DEALER 
REGISTRATION IN TITLE II OF THE JOBS ACT, at no. 4 (2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/exemption-broker-dealer-registration-jobs-act-faq.htm. 
The broker-dealer exemption allows an entity, such as a venture capital fund or its adviser, to 
operate an Internet website where it lists offerings of securities by potential portfolio companies 
(in compliance with Rule 506), co-invest in those securities with other investors, and provide 
standardized documents for use by issuers and investors, rely on Securities Act Section 4(b). 
 83. AngelList LLC & AngelList Advisors LLC, SEC No-Action Letter, 2013 WL 
1,279,194, at 1 (Mar. 28, 2013) [hereinafter AngelList No-Action Letter], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mr-noaction/2013/angellist-15a1.pdf. 
 84. FundersClub Inc. & FundersClub Mgmt. LLC, SEC No-Action Letter, 2013 WL 
1,229,456, at 1 (Mar. 26, 2013) [hereinafter FundersClub No-Action Letter], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mr-noaction/2013/funders-club-032613-15a1.pdf. 
 85. See AngelList No-Action Letter, supra note 83, at 3. 
 86. See id.; FundersClub No-Action Letter, supra note 84, at 3. 
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regulated as a broker.87 But since carried interest is payment based on 
the funded company’s success and not on the success of the 
transaction, an angel investor advising a Rule 506-compliant fund can 
receive carried interest without registering as a broker.88 
The combination of permissive JOBS Act provisions and seed-
friendly SEC No-Action letters has allowed seed financings to come 
out of the shadows and provides a strong foundation for the growth of 
the seed-financing market. 
IV. UNWARRANTED CONCERNS OF FRAUD AND OVERPROMISED 
RESULTS 
Investors have expressed valid concerns that issuers would 
perpetuate criminal fraud and would take advantage of the rules and try 
to fool investors, or exuberant companies overpromising results to 
investors.89 Interestingly, traditional angel groups have seen very little 
fraud according to Marianne Hudson, the Executive Director of Angel 
Capital Association.90 AngelList features a similar phenomenon–
thousands of companies that investors have funded after finding them 
on AngelList with zero reports of fraud to date. 
There are two reasons for this lack of fraud. First, it is much harder 
to commit fraud out in the open. AngelList profiles get attention 
because founders and investors are linked to others in the network. 
Thus, startups that get wider distribution are those connected to many 
points of the existing network. The end result is that fraudulent issuers 
would have to fool many people and conduct their business where 
everybody could see who they were talking to, and where there is also 
a record of the communication.  
The second reason for the lack of fraud is that the cost of fraud 
can be well-diversified. Given the rarity of fraud in angel investing,91 
it represents a very small drag on returns. The danger of being 
completely overexposed in one investment is significantly lower than 
with investment management, where many investments may all be 
 87. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1)–(2) (2013). 
 88. See AngelList No-Action Letter, supra note 83, at 3. 
 89. See generally Letter from Barbra Roper, Dir. of Investor Prot., Consumer Fed’n of 
Am., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Sept. 23, 2013), available at  
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-13/s70613-393.pdf (commenting on Proposed Amend-
ments to Regulation D, Form D, and Rule 156).  
 90. Mark Sullivan, SEC May Make it Harder for Angels to Get Their Wings, VB NEWS 
(May 20, 2014, 1:16 PM), http://venturebeat.com/2014/05/20/sec-may-make-it-harder-for 
-angels-to-get-their-wings/. 
 91. Id. (remarks of ACA Exec. Dir. Marianne Hudson).  
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under the control of one potentially fraudulent or incompetent manager. 
That of course does not mean that outright fraud will never occur. 
However, it remains a much smaller concern in the universe of seed 
investing than it does elsewhere in the investing for the reasons stated 
above. 
The concern of an exuberant company overpromising results is 
actually more relevant given that seed-stage startups are—by 
definition—raising money for the first time and therefore less able to 
assess the chances for success than a company with lengthy experience 
running a company. The technology-startup seed financing market 
avoids the risk of over-exuberant companies by relying on experienced 
investors who generally know that a founder may have a misplaced 
belief in his or her own success.92 
As seed financing expands, additional mechanisms have grown to 
address the issues of fraud and overpromised results. First, platforms 
educate issuers. The incubators, accelerators, and online platforms 
often provide guidance to the startups about not making overstated 
claims about future performance or misleading about current results.  
Second, lead investors are more experienced. There is usually an 
experienced investor in each deal (AngelList has formalized that 
requirement for any online closing).93 That investor evaluates where 
the company fits in the landscape and makes an assessment as to 
whether the deal terms are within current market norms. These 
mechanisms do not obviate the problems entirely, but reputable 
platforms like incubators and accelerators are motivated to uphold their 
reputation in the investment community to stay competitive, thereby 
developing structures to avoid unnecessary risks to investors.  
V. SEVEN PRINCIPLES FOR REGULATING INNOVATION FINANCING 
The federal government has made tremendous progress in passing 
legislating and clarifying enforcement to account for seed financing. 
Nevertheless, room for growth remains as the seed financing markets 
expand to foster the growth of innovative technology businesses. The 
following seven principles offer guidance to regulators and lawmakers 
on how to encourage more small-scale financing of innovation without 
introducing new opportunities for fraud or bad experiences for 
investors and companies. 
 92. The background of AngelList investors shows a high level of experience among angel 
investors. See Investors, ANGELLIST, supra note 38. 
 93. See Syndicates, ANGELLIST, https://angel.co/syndicates (last visited Sept. 5, 2014). 
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A. Put Regulatory Costs as Late in the Process as Possible 
Only 5%–10% of startups succeed in attracting investors.94 Often 
the parties with the information advantage are investors, not compa-
nies.95 Putting regulatory costs up-front, with the idea of providing a 
hurdle that only good companies can jump, would just dampen seed 
financing activity and not provide actual protection. Even small costs—
say, $5,000 for legal fees to comply with a regulation—get multiplied 
many times over for every successful financing since each company 
pays the regulatory fees but only a few succeed. In a market where 
companies are the best judges of their own success, up-front costs 
might be a very useful regulatory tool. Unfortunately, in innovation-
intensive industries like technology, investors are actually in a better 
position to judge whether the market will accept the startup. 
Consequently, up-front costs are no longer a good filter; they are 
simply a huge cost and a drain on the system. 
B. Encourage Investor Transparency  
In seed-financing markets, the more investment activity that 
happens in the public eye, rather than behind-closed-doors, the better. 
In today’s world, investors review a company’s information online 
before investing, just as consumers check online reviews before 
purchasing something that looks too good to be true. Fraudulent 
companies preferred a private world, where fraud could happen outside 
the view of the perceptive public and regulators. Laws that place costs 
on communications—by restricting communications, requiring 
additional filings rather than just maintaining records, forcing 
companies into a particular format, or requiring companies to publicly 
disclose sensitive information—would logically reduce investor 
protection by pushing communication behind closed doors (and 
making it verbal rather than written) without the opportunity for public 
vetting of the company. 
 94. See Video Interview by Jonathan Sandlund, Diving into Equity Crowdfunding with Jeff 
Lynn, CEO of Seedrs, CROWD CAFE (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.thecrowdcafe.com/equity 
-crowdfunding-with-jeff-lynn/ (discussion at 1:44); see also CANADIAN MEDIA FUND, 
Crowdfunding in a Canadian Context, Facts and Stats, How Likely is Your Crowdfunding 
Campaign to Succeed (Jan. 21, 2014), http://crowdfunding.cmf-fmc.ca/facts_and_stats/how 
-likely-is-your-crowdfunding-campaign-to-succeed.  
 95. See supra Part I.B. 
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C. Encourage Investor Diversification by Reducing Individual 
Investment Transaction Costs 
Since most startups fail,96 lawmakers and regulators should 
encourage investors to invest in many startups. Increasing transaction 
costs on each startup is counterproductive; regulators should encourage 
mechanisms that allow investors to diversify across many deals. By 
some calculations, at the new highly skewed returns, investors should 
have at least seventy investments for a sufficient chance of doubling 
their money.97 If the amount of each investment were $25,000, this 
would translate into a total allocation to seed financing of $1.75 
million. Since startup investments should comprise less than 10% of an 
investor’s personal portfolio,98 that would require a net worth of well 
over $15 million, combined with the time and inclination to invest and 
monitor many seed-stage startups. This would reduce the pool of angels 
to only a handful of people in Silicon Valley who enjoy the sport of 
investing rather than create the type of robust market that is needed. 
Regulators should encourage mechanisms that allow accredited 
investors to invest $2,500 instead of $25,000.  
D. Encourage Automation 
The authors believe automation is the secret sauce that can  
increase compliance and make compliance with the rules less onerous 
and costly. The securities regulation rules could be built into the user 
interface of automated systems like AngelList. Unfortunately, 
regulations are rarely written with automation in mind. For example, 
the word reasonable is anathema to automators because computer 
programming more easily solves yes–no problems than abstract 
problems, like “what is reasonable?” 
Accredited investor status queries provide an easy opportunity for 
automation. If it were easy to verify an investor’s status as accredited, 
like a single check of a system run by the IRS, then everybody could 
be checked for accreditation with no cost to the system. This type of 
streamlined regulatory system might fail to screen out a recently 
unemployed investor after the initial check, but such a limited 
 96. See Deborah Gage, The Venture Capital Secret: 3 Out of 4 Start-Ups Fail, WALL 
ST. J. (Sept. 20, 2012, 12:01 AM ET), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390 
443720204578004980476429190. 
 97. See Kevin Dick, Blog, How Many Angel Investments, POSSIBLE INSIGHT, http:// 
possibleinsight.com/2013/01/14/how-many-angel-investments/ (last updated Apr. 25, 2013). 
 98. Tanye Prive, Angel Investors: How the Rich Invest, FORBES (Mar. 12, 
2013, 9:27 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/2013/03/12/angels-investors-how-the 
-rich-invest/. 
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drawback would be less costly to the seed financing system than a 
robust accredited investor status requiring checks at every point in the 
process. As regulators set regulations, figuring out whether they can be 
coded in automated systems will help greatly in making the regulations 
instantly effective, ubiquitous, and cheaper to implement. 
E. Be Mindful of Costs and Benefits 
Cost-benefit analysis is crucial in crafting rules and regulations. 
For example, there are steps that are very expensive for legitimate 
accredited investors and honest companies but do little to actually 
screen-out unaccredited investors. The accredited investor net worth 
test requires investors to have over $1 million in net worth (excluding 
their primary residence).99 The verification of assets for an accredited 
investor participating in a 506(c) offering requires issuers to get 
documents dated in the last three months.100 This means that a letter 
showing accredited status can’t be valid for more than 3 months at a 
time if the issuer wishes to use the so-called “safe harbors” in the 
regulation; if it’s been longer than 3 months, the issuer needs to ask the 
investor to re-prove assets to the issuer or one of the parties identified 
in the regulation (lawyer, investment advisor, CPA, or broker). As a 
result of this rule, a lawyer once asked AngelList to track down an 
investor to personally verify that he still had over $1 million in assets. 
That investor was a billionaire, and one of the richest people in 
America. This verification process added costs to a legitimate financing 
where the verification was unnecessary given the investors vast known 
wealth. This rule could be easily improved, by allowing issuer to 
default to an annual verification where an investor exceeds the net 
worth standard by double ($2 million in net worth). When dealing with 
such wealthy investors, annual verification provides just as much 
protection, but would be far less costly and onerous to automate. A 
proper cost-benefit analysis, could greatly improve this rule, and such 
analysis is essential for crafting future laws and regulations governing 
seed financing.  
F. Align the Intermediary Interests with Investors 
The AngelList and Funders Club no-action letters the SEC issued 
in March 2013 are invaluable to seed financing by allowing platforms 
to accept carried interest. That allows platforms stay funded and 
continue serving this crucial role as a connector. If a company fails, or 
 99. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5) (2014). 
 100. Id. § 230.506(c)(2)(ii). 
 
08_ARTICLE_LAWS+ZEB (DO NOT DELETE) 3/13/2015  8:02 PM 
2015] REGULATING SEED FINANCING 21 
even if it slides sideways and does not increase in value, then the 
platform earns nothing.101 Only when the company becomes more 
valuable after the investment does the platform get any reward, which 
favors investors because the intermediaries benefit when investors 
benefit.102 This differs from proposed crowdfunding regulations, which 
would ban any co-investment or equity compensation for 
intermediaries and instead requires transaction fees.103 The regulation 
would align the intermediary interests with the volume of companies, 
which does not benefit investors because intermediaries are compen-
sated purely on volume of transactions rather than on the growth of 
each financed company. Instead, by ensuring intermediaries have a 
stake in the success of each financed company, the intermediary will 
be incentivized to ensure only high-quality companies are financed. 
Financing high-quality companies is good for those companies and 
good for investor protection.   
G. Allow the Intermediaries to Exercise Judgment 
In the experience of author Kevin Laws, one of the main functions 
of platforms is helping investors focus. Because there are hundreds of 
thousands of startups on AngelList, simply presenting all startups in a 
list would be useless to investors. Instead, platforms like AngelList 
have criteria for ranking or featuring certain opportunities so that 
investors can narrow focus to opportunities of their liking. 
As long as conflicts are disclosed by the platform, this calculated 
presentation of data to users serves a critical function to educate market 
participants. The platform knows more than anyone about the 
underlying data about investors, companies, and investments, and is 
incentivized to push the marketplace towards more credibility. 
While the added-value that platforms bring may seem obvious, the 
JOBS Act bans crowdfunding platforms for unaccredited investors 
from providing “investment advice or recommendations.”104 The 
SEC’s draft regulations go so far as to ban platforms from turning down 
startups; crowdfunding platforms would have to accept all startups, bad 
or not, because doing anything else would constitute a 
“recommendation.”105 Banning judgment in a business where 
 101. Lawrence Delevigne, CNBC Explains: Carried Interest, CNBC (March 4, 2014, 
3:31 PM ET), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101464832#. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Regulation Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 9470, Exchange Act Release 
No. 70,741, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,555–56 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (proposed rule 227.300(b)). 
 104. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2013). 
 105. Regulation Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66556 (proposed rule 227.300(c)(2)(i)–
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transactions are based on trust simply increases friction with no 
investor protection benefit. 
CONCLUSION 
The massive expansion of seed-stage investment capital has been 
great for the economy and for innovation. However, the methods that 
grew organically in seed-stage investment differ from those methods 
used by the SEC in their regulation of larger-financing activity. Both 
are aimed at achieving fraud prevention, a smoothly functioning 
market, and other policy objectives, but accomplish those goals in 
different ways.  
Although the federal government made a great leap forward in 
passing the JOBS Act and issuing no-action letters beneficial to seed-
stage investment, a host of regulatory barriers and ambiguities remain. 
If regulators and lawmakers take into account the unique characteristics 
of what it takes to facilitate seed-stage activity, then it is possible we 
could regulate this market well without accidentally killing it.  
After all, it was not that long ago that an entrepreneur raised 
$92,000 for an idea he and his partner had to create a better computer—
they named their company Apple.106 Let us support more of that 
activity in the world today. 
(iv)). 
 106. Jack Doyle, Apple, Rising: 1976-1985, POPHISTORYDIG.COM (Oct. 29, 2014), 
http://www.pophistorydig.com/?p=6270. 
 
